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Abstract
Two psychological sources of uncertainty bear implications for judgment and decision-making: external uncertainty is
seen as stemming from properties of the world, whereas internal uncertainty is seen as stemming from lack of knowledge.
The apparent source of uncertainty can be conveyed through linguistic markers, such as the pronoun of probability phrases
(e.g., I am uncertain vs. It is uncertain). Here, we investigated whether and when speakers use different pronoun subjects
as such linguistic markers (Exp. 1 and 2) and what hearers infer from them (Exp. 3 and 4). Speakers more often described
higher probabilities and knowable outcomes with internal probability phrases. In dialogue, speakers mirrored the source of
their conversational partner. Markers of the source had a main effect or interacted with the probability conveyed and speaker
expertise to shape the judgments and decisions of hearers. For example, experts voicing an internal probability phrase were
judged as more knowledgeable than experts using an external probability phrase whereas the result was the opposite for lay
speakers. We discuss how these findings inform our understanding of subjective uncertainty and uncertainty communication
theories.
Keywords: uncertainty communication, source of uncertainty, subject pronoun, pragmatics
1 Introduction
Uncertainty can seem to stem from a lack of knowledge – and
be internal – or from the properties of the environment – and
be external (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1982). The appar-
ent source of uncertainty acts as an important determinant of
probability judgment and subsequent decision-making (e.g.,
Brun & Teigen, 1990; Fox & Ülkümen, 2011; Kahneman
& Tversky, 1982; Knight, 1921; Ülkümen, Fox & Malle,
2016). Therefore, the use and interpretation of linguistic
markers of the source is important to understand. It has been
suggested that speakers choose probability phrases bearing
specific pragmatic markers to convey the source of their un-
certainty (Fox & Ülkümen, 2011; Kahneman & Tversky,
1982; Teigen, 1988b). In this paper, we aimed to provide
direct evidence for such a claim. We focused on a subtle
property of probability phrases marking the source of un-
certainty of the speaker – the subject pronoun of probability
phrases (e.g., I am uncertain vs. It is uncertain). Specif-
ically, we assessed here the determinants of the pronoun
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subject of probability phrases1 for speakers (Experiments 1
and 2) and their consequences for recipients’ judgments and
decision-making (Experiments 3 and 4).
1.1 The source of uncertainty
The traditional theoretical frameworks of perceived uncer-
tainty describe two forms of uncertainty: internal and ex-
ternal uncertainty (Fox & Ülkümen, 2011; Hacking, 1975;
Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Lagnado & Sloman, 2007).
Internal uncertainty stems from a lack of personal knowl-
edge. For instance, when one thinks that the Eiffel Tower
is probably more than 300m high, the uncertainty is in-
ternal, and attributable to the level of one’s own (lack of)
knowledge. External uncertainty stems from uncertainty at-
tributable to processes in the external world (Kahneman &
Tversky, 1982), and can be based on frequencies, and hence
generate a distributional uncertainty, or based on propensity
and hence generate a dispositional uncertainty (also called
singular uncertainty). For example, one can bet on a horse
based on the number of times she won a race in the past
(i.e., distributional external uncertainty), or based on her cur-
1In the present paper, we have chosen the label probability because this
concept can be easily compared and mapped on the numerical probability
scale. The term uncertainty might be considered more adequate than the
term probability due to its more generic nature, but we have discarded it
because the scalar properties of an uncertainty scale are less obvious. For
example, being “more uncertain”, could mean being closer to 0% or closer
to an ignorance prior such as 50% for a dichotomous outcome), whereas
an event that is “more probable” is clearly closer to 1. We have chosen the
label phrase because we focus on a phrase, not on a term or a single word.
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rent health record (i.e., dispositional external uncertainty).
Kahneman and Tversky acknowledged that, in most cases,
uncertainty is a mixture of internal and external sources.
Most empirical work use the terms epistemic and internal
interchangeably (Løhre & Teigen, 2016; Robinson, Pendle,
Rowley&Beck, 2009; Teigen&Løhre 2017; Volz, Schubotz
& Von Cramon, 2004, 2005), apparently making no distinc-
tion. However, a more recent account draws a distinction
between these categories (Fox & Ülkümen, 2017; Ülkümen
et al., 2016). Ülkümen et al. (2016) outlined two variants
of subjective uncertainty: epistemic and aleatory. In their
model, epistemic uncertainty is characterized by inadequate
knowledge or skills and aleatory uncertainty by stochastic
behaviors. Epistemic uncertainty usually applies to single
cases with binary truth value whereas aleatory uncertainty
concerns classes of possible events. Ülkümen et al. (2016)
introduced the concepts of internal and external uncertainty
as distinct from epistemic and aleatory uncertainty. The
internal-external dimension refers to the physical source of
uncertainty: is the uncertainty happening in a person’s mind
(and is internal) or is it “out there” (e.g., uncertainty about
the outcome of a future race).
The accounts of uncertainty proposed by Kahneman and
Tversky (1982) and Ülkümen et al. (2016) use a similar
terminology (internal-external; epistemic-aleatory), but this
terminology covers slightly different concepts. For Kahne-
man and Tversky, internal was synonymous to epistemic
whereas Ülkümen and Fox’s account treat the internal-
external dimension and the aleatory-epistemic dimensions as
different and logically independent. For example, they posit
that epistemic uncertainty can both be internal and external
and that in both cases it would be best conveyed with confi-
dence quantifiers (e.g., confident, certain, sure), whereas in-
ternal or external distributional uncertainty would be a form
of aleatory uncertainty and would be best conveyed with
likelihood quantifiers (e.g., likelihood, probability, chance).
The present paper takes no position on whether epistemic
and internal are identical. Although the model of Ülkümen
and Fox makes sense, we do not address it, because our
concern is with the internal/external distinction only.
From a normative point of view, two probabilities, equal
in magnitude, should be treated in the same way, regardless
of their source. Psychologically, however, this is not the
case: the sources of uncertainty has an effect on judgment,
decision-making and reasoning. Fox and Ülkümen (2011)
suggested that it is because internal and external uncertain-
ties rely on “distinct information, weights and/or processes”
(p. 25). Fox and Ülkümen marshalled evidence of such
effects from different fields. For example, in hypothetical
scenarios, people prefer to bet on a die that will be cast (ex-
ternal uncertainty) rather than on a die that has already been
cast without them seeing the outcome (internal uncertainty;
Heath & Tversky, 1991; Rothbart & Snyder, 1970). In real
life situations, peoples’ bet preference is reversed, because
they prefer to guess after the die has been thrown (Robinson
et al., 2009).
1.2 Linguistic markers of the uncertainty
source
Prior research hypothesized that the source of uncertainty
can be conveyed through the use of specific words: linguistic
markers of the source (Fox & Ülkümen, 2011; Kahneman
& Tversky, 1982; Teigen, 1988a). However, only scarce
empirical evidence has been accumulated to support this hy-
pothesis (Løhre & Teigen, 2016; Ülkümen et al., 2016). The
grammatical subject of probability phraseswas themain can-
didate of such a marker (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Løhre
& Teigen, 2016). The subject of probability phrases indicate
“who” or “what” is uncertain and it is hence logical that first
person pronouns would be more characteristic of internal
uncertainties, whereas third person neutral pronouns (i.e.,
it) would be more appropriate to convey external sources of
uncertainty.
1.3 When do speakers choose “I” and “it”?
Fox, Ulkumen and Malle (2011) tested the way people
choose markers of the source of uncertainty when com-
municating uncertainty.2 Fox and colleagues employed a
paradigm in which the source of uncertainty was manipu-
lated through the pronoun subject of the probability phrase
or the pronoun and a verbal probability associated in both
cases with a numerical probability (see respectively Exam-
ples 1 and 2):
Example 1.
A: I am 70% sure that Bush will be elected US president
again
B: There is a 70% chance that Bush will be elected US
president again
Example 2.
A: Bennie is 60% sure that Team A will beat Team B next
week.
B: Bob believes there is a 60% chance that Team B will
beat team A next week.
Fox and Malle (1997) identified a general preference for
external probability phrases that can change with contex-
tual factors. Most participants deemed external probability
phrases to be more appropriate than internal ones to pre-
dict a range of 16 world outcomes. For example, 78% of
the participants predicted the outcome of the 1992 Ameri-
can presidential election with an external probability phrase
(Example 1, Sentence B). The subject pronoun was shown to
relate to the probability conveyed by the speaker. Speakers
2Their findings are also cited as Fox and Malle (1997) in Fox and Irwin,
(1988).
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selectedmore often an internal probability phrase to convey a
higher probability (e.g., “I am X% confident that Minnesota
will beat Cincinnati”), whereas they preferred an external
probability phrase to convey a low probability (e.g., “I think
there is an X% probability that Minnesota will beat Cincin-
nati”; Study 4). Furthermore, knowledge and expertise of a
speaker moderates the use of external phrases. For exam-
ple, speakers (especially those with higher internal locus of
control) selected a confidence term to describe self-related
events more often than to describe world events (e.g., “I will
go to bed before midnight”) (Fox & Malle, 1997; Ülkümen
et al., 2016). Interestingly, more knowledgeable speakers
were more willing to communicate their uncertainty with
confidence terms than less knowledgeable speakers (e.g.,
Americans predicting the outcome of the American election
vs. the German election).
1.4 Effect of the source of uncertainty onhear-
ers
Limited evidence suggests that hearers take linguistic mark-
ers of uncertainty into consideration when interpreting un-
certainty. When making inferences, the hearers expected a
higher probability threshold to be convinced by “I” probabil-
ity phrases than by “it” probability phrases (Løhre & Teigen,
2016). Participants judged that a 60% external probabil-
ity was the minimal probability required to advise a patient
to take a new treatment, whereas the threshold was about
69% for an internal probability phrase (Løhre & Teigen,
2016). The same pattern was found in different contexts,
such as regarding advice in exam revision. However, the
effect of the subject on perceived knowledge of the speaker
was not consistent across the five experiments. Recipients
inferred that speakers uttering internal probability phrases
were more knowledgeable than speakers uttering external
probability phrases, in one study whereas in two other, the
mean differences were not statistically significant (Løhre &
Teigen, 2016; Experiment 1 vs. Experiment 3 and 4). When
making decisions, the communicated source of uncertainty
had a more consistent effect. In Fox and Malle’s studies
(1997), participants made simple binary choices and read an
internal and an external probability phrase describing each
option, as in Example 3 below. Most participants (60–70%)
preferred the house where the expert described the earth-
quake risk with an internal probability phrase. The finding
was replicated with different vignettes in two other studies.
Example 3.
• A: “I believe there is a 95% chance that Home A will
withstand an earthquake of magnitude 7 or less.”
• B: “I am 95% sure that Home B will withstand an
earthquake of magnitude 7 or less.”
Further, recipients’ preference for internal probability
phrases interacted with the expertise of the speakers: most
of the participants preferred to follow an internal probabil-
ity advice voiced by a professor, whereas most preferred to
follow the external probability advice voiced by an under-
graduate (Fox & Malle, 1997; Listener – Study 2). This
finding was taken as indirectly indicating that the source of
uncertainty provided recipients with information about the
data that were used or the processes by which uncertainty
was assessed: participants were keen to rely on the personal
belief of an expert, but would rather rely on a more factually
based opinion from a novice (Fox & Malle, 1997).
1.5 Is the subject marking the source of un-
certainty? The controversy
Some authors however dispute the possibility that the sub-
ject of uncertainty sentencesmarks the source of uncertainty.
Fox and Ülkümen (2017); and Ülkümen et al. (2016) pro-
posed that the subject of probability phrases does not convey
the source but the subjectivity of the uncertainty. They tested
this hypothesis by showing that a range of numerical prob-
ability phrases (e.g., “I am 80% sure” vs. “It is 80% sure”)
with varying subjects led to variation in subjectivity per-
ception. Participants assessed eight sentences that had four
probability quantifiers (e.g., confidence, sure, probability,
and chance) and that either featured the grammatical sub-
ject “I” or “it”. This combination however was not always
grammatically possible (e.g., I am 80% probability), so the
phrases for which the sentence did not make sense were com-
plemented with an extra verb and subject (e.g., “I think there
is an 80% probability”).
Participants judged whether the sentence elicited a more
singular or distributional reasoning (“the current signs point
to rain tomorrow” was expected to measure singular reason-
ing and “most of the time there are signs like this it rains
the next day” was expected to measure distributional rea-
soning). The subjectivity was assessed on a scale ranging
from 1: “The sentence reflects the speaker’s own subjec-
tive opinion” to 4: “The sentence reflects objective facts,
computation and/or consensus”. Results showed that the
“I” probability phrases were perceived as more subjective
than the “it” ones. Further, the subject interacted with the
quantifier type (chance and probability vs. confidence and
sure) showing that subjectivity also depended on the type
of quantifier used. It is also important to note that the sub-
ject did not have an effect on the perceived reasoning of the
speaker, showing that it did not discriminate between case
based reasoning and distributional one.
Teigen and Løhre (2017) disagreed with the proposition
that the subject describes the subjectivity of uncertainty and
not its source. They agree that the subject is a clue for sub-
jectivity, but they argue that this is because it indicates who
or what is being uncertain. The argument for the claim that
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Table 1: The four accounts describing the function of the subject of probability phrases along with their experimental manip-
ulation.
Accounts Kahneman and Tversky
(1982)
Fox and Ülkümen
(2017)
Løhre and Teigen
(2016); Teigen and
Løhre (2017)
Juanchich et al., 2017
(present paper)
Dimension marked Internal-external Subjective-Objective
(“voice”)
Internal-external Internal-external
Terminology and
definition
Not different from
epistemic-aleatory and
related to subjectivity
Logically independent
from the
epistemic-aleatory
dimension and from
the internal-external
dimension
Synonymous to
epistemic-aleatory and
related to subjectivity.
Synonymous to
epistemic-aleatory and
related to subjectivity
Manipulation -- Voice (subject or
subject + modal)
Subject (+ numerical
probability)∗
Subject
Example of
manipulation
-- Subj: I‘d say there is
an 80% probability
Int: I am 57%
certain. . .
Int: I am uncertain. . .
Obj: There is an 80%
probability
Ext: It is 45%
certain. . .
Ext: It is uncertain. . .
∗ The example provided shows the average numerical probability provided by participants. Note also that in one of the
studies only the subject was manipulated, to assess its effect on probability judgments: “How certain are you – vs. how
certain is it – Expe 5a.
the subject of probability phrases marks the source of uncer-
tainty is that the same probability term, such as “uncertain”,
can be used with different subject pronouns, some of which
refer to an object or to nothing (e.g. it is uncertain) and some
of which refer to a person (e.g., I am uncertain). Teigen and
Løhre (2017)’s approach is closer to the original proposal by
Kahneman and Tversky (1982), where epistemicness and in-
ternal uncertainty are not differentiated, and which assumes
that internal uncertainty is also more subjective than external
uncertainty. The focus of the five papers linking the subject
of uncertainty phrases to the variants of uncertainty is sum-
marized in Table 1 to provide an easier grasp of the current
landscape.
Thus, the review of the existing frameworks shows a lack
of consensus regarding the role of the subject of probability
phrases. Existing findings also fall short of providing unam-
biguous evidence of the role of the subject, because the pro-
noun manipulation was often confounded with some other
features of probability phrases. In Teigen and Løhre (2017),
the pronoun was manipulated but participants could asso-
ciate different numerical probability with it (Experiments 2
and 4), hence confounding the internality with the proba-
bility dimension. When the probability did not vary, it was
the type and syntactic category of the probability term that
varied (e.g., certainty vs. probability, Experiment 3). As
suggested by Teigen and Løhre (2017), in Fox and Ülkümen
(2017), some phrases presented as featuring a first person
pronoun actually featured two grammatical subjects and two
uncertainty quantifiers (e.g., “I think there is an 80% proba-
bility”), for which the scores were aggregated with simpler
sentences “e.g., “I am 80% certain”) and compared to a set of
simple “it” sentences such as “it is 80% certain” and “there
is an 80% probability”. This syntactical imbalance is likely
to have led to variations in the probability conveyed by the
phrases. This variation is in line with research in linguistics
where modals are considered as quantifiers of uncertainty
(Biber, Finegan, Johansson, Conrad & Leech, 1999). In
the only experiment where the pronoun was not confounded
with other variables (Teigen & Løhre 2017, Experiment 1),
the data indicated that external phrases were judged as be-
ing more informative and uttered by more knowledgeable
speakers.
1.6 Present research
Prior research indicates that linguistic markers of the source
of uncertainty play a role in communicating and interpreting
uncertainty phrases. However, we cannot draw firm conclu-
sions regarding the role of the subject as a marker of the
source of uncertainty for two reasons. First, the evidence of
the role of the subject is mixed (Løhre & Teigen, 2016) and
the view that the subject is amarker of the sourcewas recently
challenged (Fox & Ülkümen, 2017). Second, the manipu-
lation of the subject used in the prior research might have
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been consistently confounded with other factors: the prob-
ability conveyed (Fox & Ülkümen, 2017; Løhre & Teigen,
2016), the probability term and its phrasal category (Løhre
& Teigen, 2016), and the number of probability terms in the
phrase (Fox & Ülkümen, 2017; Ülkümen et al., 2016). Al-
though the confounding effects were sometimes controlled
statistically, robust experimental evidence is missing. We
propose to provide it here using parsimonious manipulation
of the subject while keeping the other dimensions constant.
Thus, the current research builds on the previous research
but strengthens its contribution by providing additional evi-
dence, while removing possible confounding variables.
In the present manuscript, Experiments 1 and 2 were de-
signed to test whether characteristics associated with the
source of uncertainty (e.g., the time of occurrence of an
event) predicted the use of a specific pronoun subject (i.e.,
“I” vs. “it”). We then tested in Experiments 3 and 4 the
effect of the subject of probability phrases on recipients’ in-
ferences. Hence we propose to test how speakers use “I”
and “it” when communicating their uncertainty and how
recipients understand probability phrases featuring “I” and
“it”. Our hypotheses were derived from the model described
by Kahneman and Tversky (1982) and supported by data
from Løhre and Teigen (2016) showing that the pronoun is a
marker of the source of uncertainty on the internal-external
continuum. Building on this account, probability phrases
featuring a first person pronoun subject are labelled inter-
nal probability phrases and probability phrases featuring a
third person neuter pronoun are labelled external probability
phrases.
Our materials were composed of the phrases featuring
only probability terms derived from the root certain (e.g.,
very uncertain, uncertain, not certain, very certain, etc. . . ).
This was a strategic choice because the lemma certain is
used with both first and neuter third person pronouns and can
be used to convey a large range of probability magnitudes
from around 30% to 100% (Bryant & Norman, 1980; Reyna,
1981). Other confidence terms such as confident, think or
believe do not offer the same flexibility and can be used
only with an animated subject (Donald thinks that. . . , the
mouse believes the cheese is here). Likelihood terms such
as chance can also convey a range of probabilities but can
only be used with inanimate subjects described with dummy
pronouns or nominal phrases (e.g., there is a chance that it
will rain). We also chose not to mix words with numbers
because uncertainty words are considered as more natural
(Wallsten, Budescu, Zwick&Kemp, 1993), and are expected
to be more flexible and to better reflect the way in which
people feel uncertain than numbers (Zimmer, 1986).
1.7 Speakers’ experiments
The two following experiments tested the factors driving
speakers’ preferences for communicating internal and ex-
ternal probability phrases. We aimed (1) to replicate past
findings of Fox and Malle (1997) regarding the expertise of
the speaker and likelihood of the event without confounded
variables, (2) to test previously untested theoretical proposi-
tions (e.g., that the time location of the uncertain event affects
the source of uncertainty; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982), and
(3) to explore the effect of conversational dynamics (e.g.,
agreeing vs. disagreeing) on the preference for internal and
external probability phrases.
2 Experiment 1
Given that uncertainty for past outcomes relies more on in-
ternal uncertainty, we hypothesized that people would prefer
internal probability phrases (“I” probability phrases) when
describing past outcomes (vs. present and future outcomes).
Further, building on Fox and Malle’s (1997) findings, we ex-
pected that participants would prefer to communicate higher
probabilities with internal phrases, and medium or low prob-
abilities with external phrases. Regarding the conversational
context, our assumption was that contradicting a person is
face-threatening (Brown & Levinson, 1987), which could be
softened by the use of an internal probability phrase (i.e.,
belonging to the person). In contrast, we expected partici-
pants to prefer external probability phrases, as reflecting a
more objective reality (i.e., belonging to the world) when
confirming a previously voiced opinion to strengthen the
effect of the agreement. Finally, given that internal proba-
bility phrases can be taken as more subjective, we expected
a lower perceived disagreement between two internal proba-
bility phrases than between two external probability phrases.
2.1 Method and results
Participants Overall 212 participants from Amazon Me-
chanical Turk took part in the survey. Amazon Mechanical
Turk is considered as a reliable source of participants in psy-
chology (Buhrmester, Kwang & Gosling, 2011; Paolacci,
Chandler & Ipeirotis, 2010). Participants’ age ranged from
18 to 67 (M = 34, SD = 13), mostly Caucasian Americans
(78%), women (57%), employed (70%), with some College
education (87%).
Stimuli and Procedure. Participants were informed that
the goal of the study was to investigate their preference for
internal (I am not certain) or external (It is not certain) prob-
ability phrases in uncertainty communication. All question-
naires contained five selection tasks, presented in random
order for each participant, in which participants were in-
structed to choose the sentence that was most appropriate in
a list of two or four sentences.
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Task 1: Outcome date. Participants communicated a risk
associated with an outcome that happens either in the past,
present or future. In a between-subjects design, participants
described the risk related to a drug which was either pro-
duced in the past (drugs that were produced in the Nineties),
in the present (drugs that are produced now) or in the future
(drugs that will be produced in the future). Participants com-
municated the risk by selecting one among four probability
phrases. The four phrases resulted from the crossing of two
degrees of certainty (i.e., not certain and quite certain) and
two sources of uncertainty (i.e., I am vs. It is).
• “I am not certain that drugs that were produced in the
Nineties were harmless.”
• “It is not certain that drugs that were produced in the
Nineties were harmless.”
• “I am quite certain that drugs that were produced in the
Nineties were harmless.”
• “It is quite certain that drugs that were produced in the
Nineties were harmless.”
Participants could choose one of four phrases, two internal
and two external. For the analysis, we summed the rate of
selection of internal and external phrases.
Task 1 Results. Overall, to describe harmfulness of drugs,
participants had a slight preference for internal probability
phrases (“I am”, 54.7%). They chose internal phrases more
often to describe the present risk of harm (63.2%) than to
describe the same risk located in the past (52.5%) or in the
future (48.4%), but these differences were not statistically
significant (χ2(2, N = 212) = 3.17, p = .205, φ = .12).
Task 2: Dice probability scenario. Participants were
asked to select a phrase to express a medium or a high prob-
ability of a specific outcome in a dice roll: a 50% probable
outcome (obtaining a score above 3: 4, 5 or 6), or an 83%
probability (obtaining a score higher than 1: 2, 3, 4, 5 or
6). They selected one among four probability phrases taken
from Task 1: I am/It is not certain and I am/It is quite certain.
The four phrases resulted from the crossing of two degrees of
certainty (i.e., uncertain and quite certain) and two sources
of uncertainty (i.e., I am vs. It is). Participants could choose
one of four phrases, two internal and two external. For the
analysis, we summed the rate of selection of internal and
external phrases.
Task 2 Results. Overall, to describe the probability of ob-
taining a given score with a die, half of the participants
selected an internal probability phrase (48.8%) and the other
half selected an external one. In line with our hypothesis,
participants selected more internal probability phrases to de-
scribe the high probability outcome (60.6%) than to describe
the medium probability outcome (39.8%; χ2(1, N = 212) =
9.13, p = .003, φ = − − .21).
Task 3: Contradiction scenario . Participants played
the role of Speaker 2 in a dialogue between Speaker 1 and
Speaker 2 about the chances of Laura passing her exam.
The vignette was designed using a 2 (Contradiction trend:
Speaker 2 was less certain vs. more certain) × 2 (Source
of uncertainty used by Speaker 1: internal vs. external)
between-subjects design. The second speaker (the partic-
ipant) was either less certain (Speaker 1: certain – Speaker
2: not certain) or more certain than Speaker 1 (Speaker 1:
not certain – Speaker 2: certain). Further, Speaker 1 was
either voicing an external or an internal probability phrase.
Participants took the role of Speaker 2 and had to choose to
use an internal or an external probability phrase to respond
to Speaker 1.
In the less certain contradiction condition, participants
read the following in the internal source for Speaker 1 condi-
tion. The text between brackets shows the equivalent in the
external source condition:
Select the response that sounds the most appropriate.
Speaker 1: - “I am [It is] certain that Laura will pass her
exam”.
Speaker 2:
• “No, it is not certain”.
• “No, I am not certain”.
In the more certain contradiction condition, participants
read the following:
Speaker 1: - “I am [It is] not certain that Laura will pass
her exam”.
Speaker 2:
• “No, it is certain”.
• “No, I am certain”.
Task 3: Results. To voice a contradiction, partici-
pants overall slightly preferred external probability phrases
(54.7%). To test the effect of the direction of the contradic-
tion (more certain vs. less certain) and of the pronoun used
by the first speaker, we conducted a logistic regression with
the two factors as the independent variable and the source of
uncertainty of the phrase chosen as the dependent variable
(I am vs. It is). The regression model predicted correctly
67.5% of the cases (χ2(2, N = 212) = 29.76, p < .001, Cox
and Snell R2 = .13).
Participants selected more often an external probability
phrase when they were less certain than Speaker 1 (certain
→ it is uncertain; 58.9%) than when they were more certain
than Speaker 1 (uncertain→ it is certain; 50%; B(df = 1) =
–0.64, SE = 0.31, p = .038, OR = 0.53, 95% CI [0.29, 0.96]).
Further, participants were more likely to mirror the source of
uncertainty selected by their conversational partners (B (df
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= 1) = 1.55, SE = 0.31, p < .001, OR = 4.73, 95% CI [2.59,
8.62]). When the first speaker uttered an internal probabil-
ity phrase, participants were more likely to respond with an
internal probability phrase too (64.2%), and similarly, when
the first speaker uttered an external probability phrase, par-
ticipants also responded with an external probability phrase
(70.1%).
Task 4: Confirmation scenario. Participants read a dia-
logue between two conversational partners (Speaker 1 and
Speaker 2) discussing the chances of Denis passing his driv-
ing license. In a 2 (Probability magnitude: medium vs.
high) × 2 (Source of uncertainty: internal vs. external uncer-
tainty) between-subjects design, Speaker 1 conveyed either a
medium or high probability (i.e., not certain vs. certain), us-
ing either an internal or an external probability phrase (I am
vs. It is). Participants chose the most appropriate probability
phrase for the second conversational partner.
For instance, in the medium probability condition, partic-
ipants read the following:
Speaker 1: “I am [It is] not certain that Denis will pass
his driving licence”.
Speaker 2: “Yes, it is not certain”
Speaker 2: “Yes, I am not certain”
In the high probability condition, participants read the fol-
lowing:
Speaker 1: “I am [It is] certain that Denis will pass his
driving licence”.
Speaker 2: “Yes, it is certain”
Speaker 2: “Yes, I am certain”
Task 4: Results. Overall, to voice a confirmation, partici-
pants used more often external probability phrases (61.3%).
To test for the main effect of the probability conveyed and of
the marker of the source used by Speaker 1, we conducted
a logistic regression with the probability magnitude and the
source of Speaker 1 as independent variables and the choice
of the marker of the source by participants as the dependent
variable. The regression model predicted correctly 70.3% of
the cases (χ2(2, N = 212) = 30.99, p < .001, Cox and Snell
R2 = .14).
As expected, and as in the dice scenario, participants used
an internal probability phrase more often to convey a high
probability than to convey a medium probability (49.1% vs.
26.5%; B (df = 1) = –0.85, SE = 0.31, p =.006, OR = 0.43,
95% CI [0.23, 0.78]).
Further, as in the contradiction scenario, participants mir-
rored the source of uncertainty of their conversational part-
ner. When the first speaker used an internal probability
phrase, participants preferred an internal probability phrase
(55.4%), whereas when the first speaker used an external
probability phrase, most participants preferred answering
with an external probability phrase (76.6%; B (df = 1) =
1.32, SE = 0.31, p < .001, OR = 3.73, 95% CI [2.05, 6.81]).
Task 5: Level of disagreement betweenpredictions. Par-
ticipants read two rain forecasts broadcast by two different
TV channels. Both forecasts featured the same source of
uncertainty but conveyed a different probability magnitude.
Participants judged the extent to which the forecasters dis-
agreed on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1: Not at all
to 5: Completely.
• “I am [It is] certain that it will rain.”
• “I am [It is] uncertain that it will rain.”
Task 5: Results. Overall, participants rated that the two
weather forecasters, who made different probabilistic fore-
casts using the same marker of the source, disagreed (M =
3.66, SD = 1.16 on a 5-point scale ranging from Not at all
to Completely). However, the markers of the source in the
probability phrases did not have an effect on participants’
perception of the level of disagreement between the weather
forecasters (MInternal = 3.70, SD = 1.22 and MExternal = 3.64,
SD = 1.12, t (210) = 0.37, p = .710, d = 0.05).
2.2 Discussion
In the five scenarios, participants chose a different pronoun
subject as a function of the probability of occurrence of the
outcome and the conversational situation. Participants used
more internal probability phrases to express high probabili-
ties than to express medium probabilities. The effect of the
probability magnitude on the preference for specific phrase
subjects does not exactly match the view that the pronoun is a
marker of the source or subjectivity, given that any dice out-
come could be considered as equally objective and stemming
from aleatory uncertainty.
Participants did not have different subject preferences for
outcomes that are typically frequency based and considered
objective (e.g., the outcome of a dice roll) and outcomes that
are less distributional and more subjective (whether drugs
can be harmful) – the average was around 50% for both.
This does not support the hypothesis that the subject marks
the source of uncertainty nor the hypothesis that third person
pronouns mark objectivity (Fox & Ülkümen, 2017). Inter-
estingly, when set in a conversation, participants preferred
to convey the same source of uncertainty as their conver-
sational partners, whether they agreed with or contradicted
that person.
Our data did not show that the timing of an outcomewould
affect the preference of markers of the source of uncertainty.
This appears to contrast with previous findings that the time
of occurrence of an outcome is an important factor in de-
termining the source of uncertainty (Brun & Teigen, 1990;
Kahneman & Tversky, 1982). Our result complements the
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findings of Ülkümen et al. (2016) who found that future
outcomes were more often described with likelihood quan-
tifiers, albeit not after controlling for other aspects of the
sentence (e.g., control, source). The next experiment aimed
to further look into the time of occurrence of an outcome
in conjunction with the level of knowledge regarding this
outcome.
3 Experiment 2
We propose that knowledge is a key variable to explain the
effect of timing observed in past research (Brun & Teigen,
1990; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982) and the lack of effect
observed in Experiment 1. We propose that the knowability
of an outcome – whether one can assess whether it will occur
or not – is often confounded with the timing of an event –
predicts the preference for “I” vs. “it” sentences.
Uncertainty about past outcomes stems from a lack of per-
sonal knowledge because whether the outcome has occurred
or not is a fact that at least some people know. Uncertainty
about future outcomes may stem from a lack of knowledge
but also from stochastic properties of the world such that
nobody knows for sure what will happen. In our drug sce-
nario in Experiment 1, participantsmay not have experienced
variations in perceived knowledge regarding the outcome
whether it was past, present or future. Indeed, the time when
the drug could be dangerous and the degree of knowledge of
participants regarding drugs may not have been connected
(e.g., strong knowledge of the dangerousness of past drugs
vs. lack of knowledge of the dangerousness of future drugs).
The timing of an event and its knowability are independent
dimensions that are negatively correlated (more knowledge
about past events) for some outcomes but not for some others.
There are instances where the opposite relationship exists:
we sometimes lack knowledge about past outcomes (e.g.,
whether Shakespeare has or has not written King Lear) and
we can be very knowledgeable about future outcomes (e.g.,
when and where the moon will rise in a week).
We propose that one of the mechanisms underlying the
preference for internal or external probability phrases re-
lies on the knowledge of the outcome and the instrumen-
tality of this knowledge to assess uncertainty. Building on
the “knowability” dimensions proposed by Chow and Sarin
(2002), we investigated the preference for internal and exter-
nal probability phrases for known, predictable and unknow-
able outcomes. We expected that participants would use
more internal probability phrases for known or predictable
outcomes than for unknown outcomes.
3.1 Method
Participants. One hundred and thirty-one students at a
Norwegian university took part in the survey. The socio-
demographic characteristics of this group were not recorded.
Materials and Procedure. We selected 10 outcomes
(listed below) falling into three categories: known outcomes,
predictable outcomes and unknowable outcomes. Known
outcomes were defined as either past agreed outcomes (e.g.,
the UN was founded after the war) or current realities (e.g.,
Sweden won the last match against Denmark). For known
outcomes, uncertainty is deemed only internal because a
quick search would enable people to reach certainty. Pre-
dictable outcomeswere defined as future outcomes for which
uncertainty is both internal and external: knowledge about
the world helps to reduce uncertainty but cannot bring cer-
tainty. Unknowable outcomes were defined as past, present
or future outcomes that are unknowable for certain, given the
state of knowledge of humanity. For those outcomes, there
is no identified point in time where the outcome will be fully
certain. Uncertainty for those outcomes relies further on
external uncertainty because nobody has a true knowledge
of whether an event has happened or will happen.
For each outcome, participants selected one of two proba-
bility phrases that appearedmost natural to them between the
phrase featuring “I am” and the one featuring “It is”. If they
perceived both phrases to be natural, participants were asked
to select the one that sounded most like a genuine quotation.
Participants selected a probability phrase for four known
outcomes, four predictable outcomes and two unknowable
outcomes. The outcomes were described with medium or
high verbal probabilities which are presented below between
brackets. The four known outcomes were composed of
two historical events and two geographical facts: “The UN
was founded after the war” (almost certain), “Sweden won
their last match against Denmark” (uncertain), “Lithuania is
South of Latvia” (uncertain), “Toulouse is in France” (cer-
tain). The four predictable outcomes were all located in the
future: “Spain will be part of the 2012 European Champi-
onships” (quite certain)3, “Sweden will win their next match
against Denmark” (uncertain), “What I will do tomorrow”
(not certain), “Hans will accept the offer” (not certain). The
two unknowable outcomes were: “There is life on other
planets” (quite certain) and “Robin Hood has actually lived”
(not certain). Participants then completed an additional task
which is not reported here. The order of the question was
fixed as follows: UN, Spain, Sweden past match, Sweden
future match, life on other planets, Robin Hood, Lithuania,
Toulouse, What I will do and What Hans will do. The sur-
vey was in Norwegian and is presented in English in the
Appendix.
3The data was collected in 2011, before participants could know who
would take part in the 2012 European Championships.
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Table 2: Preference for internal and external probability phrases (in %) along with a binomial test with a value of 50%. “I” is
a marker of internal source of uncertainty and “It” is a marker of external source of uncertainty.
Source of uncertainty
Knowledge Outcome I am It is Binomial test
Known
(past/current)
UN – Almost certain 92.4 7.6 p < .001
Sweden – Uncertain 96.2 3.8 p < .001
Lithuania – Uncertain 95.4 4.6 p < .001
Toulouse – Certain 68.7 31.3 p < .001
Total knowable 88.2 11.8
Predictable
(future)
Spain - Quite certain 57.3 42.7 p = .115
Sweden – Uncertain 37.7 62.3 p = .006
What I will do - Not certain 95.4 4.6 p < .001
What Hans will do - Not certain 65.6 34.4 p < .001
Total predictable 64.0 36.0
Unknowable
Life on other planets - Quite certain 48.9 51.1 p = .861
Robin Hood - Not certain 26.0 74.0 p < .001
Total unknowable 37.4 62.6
Grand Total 63.2 46.8
3.2 Results and discussion
As expected, participants selected more often an internal
probability phrase for known and predictable outcomes than
for unknowable outcomes. To describe the four knowable
outcomes, a large majority of participants selected an inter-
nal probability phrase as more natural than an external one
(88%, see Table 2). For predictable outcomes, the prefer-
ence for an internal or external source of uncertainty was
less strong, with three phrases out of four where participants
preferred the internal version, forming overall a smaller ma-
jority (64%). Regarding the future outcomes, one can also
see that the preference for the first person pronoun subject
was stronger when the statement was about the speaker and
featured a first person pronoun. The only item for which “it”
was preferred among the future outcome was for the future
results of a Swedish football match. This preference may
have been the result of a contrast between this question and
the previous one that focused on the past result of the Swedish
team and for which participants largely preferred the “I” pre-
diction. This echoes findings of Experiment 1, showing a
mirroring effect in conversation. Finally, for unknowable
outcomes (i.e., life on other planets and Robin Hood), par-
ticipants preferred external probability phrases, although this
preference was significantly different from 50% only for the
Robin Hood sentence.
We computed a summation score of preference for internal
probability phrases within each outcome category (known,
predictable and unknowable outcomes), and we normalized
this score by the total number of sentences within the out-
come category. Hence, each participant had a score ranging
from 0 to 1 for known, predictable and unknowable out-
comes, 0 representing a systematic preference for external
probability phrases and 1 a systematic preference for in-
ternal probability phrases. We entered these three scores
in a within-subject (“repeated measures”) variance analysis
with the type of outcome as independent variable and the
internal probability phrase score as dependent. The type
of outcome had a main effect on the preference for internal
probability phrases (F(2,260) = 129.29, p < .001, η2
p
= .50).
Participants exhibited a stronger preference for internal prob-
ability phrases for knowable outcomes than for predictable
outcomes and unknowable outcomes (MDiff = 0.32; 95% CI
[0.26, 0.38], p < .001; and MDiff = 0.51, CI [0.43, 0.59], p
< .001), respectively, and a stronger preference for internal
probability phrases for predictable outcomes than for un-
knowable outcomes (MDiff = 0.19, p < .001, CI [0.10, 0.27],
pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni adjustment).
3.3 Interim discussion
Overall, the two experiments presented here complement
and extend the current literature in several respects. First,
the knowability of an outcome is a good predictor of the
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preference for internal and external probability phrases. Par-
ticipants preferred strongly internal phrases for known out-
comes – defined as established historical or geographical
facts –whereas this preferencewas less strong for predictable
outcomes and even the opposite for unknowable outcomes.
Second, speakers have a slight preference for internal prob-
ability phrases (e.g., “I am not certain”). However, this
preference depended – in addition to the knowability – on
the likelihood of occurrence of the outcome as well as the
conversational context. This general internal preference and
the role of the probabilitymagnitude replicates prior findings
(Fox & Malle, 1997). Third, and more novel, participants
tended to choose more often a probability phrase that mir-
rored the source of uncertainty used by their conversational
partner (conversation vignettes in Experiment 1 and Personal
future action phrase in Experiment 2).
Furthermore, results of Experiment 2 do not support the
hypothesis that the pronoun subject was chosen to mark the
subjectivity of the speaker (Fox&Ülkümen, 2017; Ülkümen
et al., 2016). Indeed, outcomes characterized by the least
amount of data or a lack of consensus and whose probability
was hence subjective (e.g., life on other planets), were more
often described with a third person neuter pronoun, which
was posited to mark objectivity. In contrast, outcomes for
which facts existed or are consensually agreed and whose
probability was hence more objective were mainly described
with first person pronoun phrases. These results are more
in line with the hypothesis that the subject of uncertainty
phrases is primarily a marker of the source of uncertainty
(Teigen & Løhre 2017).
Given that speakers use contextual cues to decide whether
it is best to say “I am uncertain” or “It is uncertain”, then
we can assume that the pronoun subject carries pragmatic
implications for recipients. The possibility that probability
phrases convey pragmatic meanings (e.g., about the state of
knowledge of speakers, about their intentions) is not novel
and falls within a literature strand positing that probabil-
ity phrases convey more than a vague probability magni-
tude to recipients (Moxey & Sanford, 2000; Teigen & Brun,
2003). More generally, the hypothesis that language has a
strong pragmatic layer fits a functional approach of language
(Fiedler, 2008).
3.4 Impact of linguistic markers of uncer-
tainty sources on hearers
There is little and mixed evidence about what recipients in-
fer from linguistic markers of the source of uncertainty. For
example, in one article, recipients inferred that speakers ut-
tering internal probability phrases were more knowledgeable
than speakers uttering external probability phrases in one
study out of three; in the remaining two studies, the mean
differences were not statistically significant (Løhre&Teigen,
2016; Experiment 1 vs. Experiment 3 and 4). Another ex-
ample of mixed results is related to the inference about the
personal interest of the speaker: in one study out of two,
a first person pronoun was taken as a cue of increased per-
sonal interest in comparison with a neuter subject pronoun
(Experiment 3 vs. Experiment 4).
Previous research indicated that recipients may draw some
inferences from the use of internal and external probability
phrases such as speakers’ levels of knowledge or the nature
of the evidence they used (Fox & Malle, 1997; Løhre &
Teigen, 2016; Ülkümen et al., 2016). However, the pattern
of inferences drawn in previous research was not consistent.
In Experiments 3 and 4, we assess the impact of internal
and external probability phrases on the recipients’ inferences
and their decisions. Experiments 3 and 4 aim to replicate
and broaden previous findings by showing that linguistic
markers of the source of uncertainty affect the judgments
and decisions of recipients (Fox & Malle, 1997; Løhre &
Teigen, 2016; Ülkümen et al., 2016).
4 Experiment 3
We hypothesized that markers of the source of uncertainty
used in probability phrases would affect the recipients’ judg-
ments about the speaker as well as their subsequent deci-
sions. This expectation is consistent with prior research
(Løhre & Teigen, 2016). Specifically, we expected that re-
cipients would perceive speakers uttering an external proba-
bility phrase as more knowledgeable and less supporting of
the outcome. We expected that recipients would interpret
external probability phrases as being based on outcome fre-
quencies and as being more informative than internal prob-
ability phrases. Finally, we expected that recipients would
be more likely to use external probability phrases to guide
hypothetical bets than internal probability phrases.
4.1 Method
Participants. Overall 256 native French speakers took part
in the survey, recruited through a pool of participants in-
terested in cognition (RISC – Réseau d’Information Sur la
Cognition). Participants were between 19 and 69 years old
(M = 30.64, SD = 10.47) and 66% of them were women.
Design. Hypotheses were tested in a 2 (Source of uncer-
tainty: internal vs. external) × 3 (Probabilitymagnitude: low,
medium, high) mixed-design. The source of uncertainty was
manipulated between-subjects by the subject pronoun used
in the prediction, either “I” or “It”. The probability mag-
nitude was manipulated within-subject using three different
verbal probabilities: very uncertain, not certain and almost
certain.
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Table 3: Internal and external probability phrases used in Experiments 3 and 4.
Probability Probability phrase
Low “I am [It is] very uncertain that VfL Bochum will win against Hoffenheim.”
Moderate “I am [It is] not certain that Wolfsburg will win against FSV Mayence.”
High “I am [It is] almost certain that Borussia Dortmund will win against the Bayer Leverkusen.”
Materials and procedure. Participants took part in
the questionnaire on the Internet (using the platform
LimeSurvey®). Participants were asked to randomly select
one of two web-links to participate: the first link led to the
questionnaire featuring internal probability phrases and the
second link led to the questionnaire featuring external prob-
ability phrases. Participants were instructed to pay attention
before validating their answers, as they could not go back.
Participants judged three football game predictions made
by Leo (a French person randomly selected as part of a
survey on football knowledge). The three predictions fea-
tured different probability magnitudes and focused on dif-
ferent hypothetical matches in the German league: Match
1, VfL Bochum vs. Hoffenheim; Match 2, Wolfsburg vs.
FSV Mayence; Match 3, Borussia Dortmund vs. the Bayer
Leverkusen. The same pairs were used for all participants.
The first team of each pair was predicted as having a low,
moderate and high probability of winning, respectively. The
probability magnitude of winning was manipulated by us-
ing a verbal probability reflecting a low, moderate or high
probability as shown in Table 3.
The order of presentation of the probability phrases was
either from low to high probabilitymagnitude or from high to
low. The pairs of teams and their associated probabilities of
wining were selected randomly in the German Champions’
league.
For each football game prediction, participants answered
five questions. Participants assessed the speaker’s knowl-
edge of the two teams and whether he supported the team
concerned with the prediction. Participants also assessed
the extent to which the prediction was based on statistical
information and informativeness. Finally, participants as-
sessed their willingness to use the information if they were
to bet on the game. Questions were presented in a fixed
order: knowledge of the speaker, prediction based on statis-
tics, use of the prediction if betting, informativeness of the
prediction, and team preference of the speaker. Participants
provided their judgments on 5-point Likert scales. On a new
webpage, as a manipulation check for the probability ma-
nipulation, participants were subsequently reminded of each
prediction and assessed the probability conveyed by Leo on
an 11-point scale ranging from 0: “Leo is certain that the
team will not win” to 10: “Leo is certain that the team will
win”. Finally, participants provided their age, gender, job,
and mother tongue, and their subjective level of expertise in
the German Champions Football League (scale from 1: No
knowledge at all to 5: Expert about this Championship).
4.2 Results
Manipulation checks. The expertise of participants in the
German league was relatively low (M = 1.21, SD = 0.60, on
a scale ranging from 1 to 5) and did not affect the dependent
variables nor interact with the independent variables. The
expertisewas therefore not included in the analyses described
below.
We checked whether the manipulation of the probability
magnitude was effective by comparing participants’ proba-
bility perception in the different probability magnitude con-
ditions. Further, we tested whether the source of uncertainty
(“I” vs. “It”) affected the probability perceived by partici-
pants, as this could suggest that the effect of the source could
be indirect through probability perception. We conducted a
mixed design variance analysis with probability magnitude
and source as independent variables and probability per-
ception as dependent variable. The probability magnitude
manipulation was successful. The probability perception
was low for very uncertain predictions 3.22 (SD = 2.48),
moderate for not certain 4.34 (SD = 1.71) and high for al-
most certain 7.67 (SD = 1.43; 11-point scale ranging from
certain that the team will not win to certain that the team
will win; and F(1.67,425.12) = 375.99, p < .001, η2
p
= .60).
Furthermore, and importantly, the source of uncertainty did
not have a main effect or an interaction effect with probabil-
ity magnitude on probability perception, Fs < 1. Therefore,
internal and external probability phrases were perceived as
conveying the same levels of probability.
Effects of source of uncertainty and probability magni-
tude. Figure 1 illustrates all results. For each of the de-
pendent variables (other than probability), we asked whether
the mean response was dependent on the source (“I” vs.
“It”) with a between-group t-test. We also assessed the
effect of probability on each variable by subtracting the low-
probability case from the high-probability case, for each
subject. All dependent variables except the variable Use
of statistics yielded higher ratings with higher probabilities
(p < .001 for each of the four).
Speakers were judged as more knowledgeable when they
used an external probability phrase (“It”) than when they
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Figure 1: Mean judgments provided for three football game predictions as a function of the sentence subject (“I” vs. “it”),
Experiment 3. Judgments focus on the speaker’s knowledge and support, on the data used in the prediction, the prediction
informativeness and about participants’ willingness to use the prediction in betting. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals.
Note: All judgments used a 5-point scale ranging from 1: Not at all to 5: Completely. High probability of winning: Borussia
Dortmund vs. the Bayer Leverkusen; Moderate probability of winning: Wolfsburg vs. FSV Mayence and low probability of
winning: VfL Bochum vs. Hoffenheim.
used an internal phrase, but this differencewas not significant
(t (240.15) = 1.29, n.s., Welch corrected). But the high-low
probability difference also differed as a function of source
(t (253.45) = 2.25, p = .025). As is apparent in Figure
1, the effect of source was present only for the two highest
probabilities. The resulte for usefulness in betting were
similar (t (247.71) = 1.75 for the main effect, t (226.89) =
4.03, p < .001, for the high-low difference).
The source did not make a difference in terms of team
support. External probability phrases were perceived to be
more often based on statistics (t (216.5) = 2.65, p = .001)
and to be more informative(t (253.14) = 3.62, p < .001).
The results of the present experiment illustrate that recip-
ients can draw inferences from the pronoun subject used in
a prediction. Participants use the grammatical subjects of
probability phrases to draw inferences about the prediction
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and its speaker. These inferences are consistent with the as-
sumption that the grammatical subject of a probability phrase
is a marker of a speaker’s source of uncertainty and that the
source of uncertainty conveyed has psychological implica-
tions for the hearer. For example, participants perceived an
external probability phrase as more statistically based and
more informative than internal probability phrases.
These results highlight that participants infer that speakers
using a neuter third person pronoun rely more on an exter-
nal source of uncertainty. The sentence subject was also
related to perception of subjectivity, but this effect was de-
pendent on the strength of the belief conveyed by the speaker.
The judgments of informativeness and willingness to use in
betting depended on both the grammatical subject and the
probability conveyed. In the next experiment, we assessed
the role of the expertise of the speaker by manipulating it.
Further, we improved the design by randomizing the order
of the predictions and of the questions.
5 Experiment 4
Experiment 4 tests further the effect of the source of un-
certainty communicated on judgment and decision-making.
We replicated the uncertainty source manipulation and ex-
tended Experiment 3 by manipulating the expertise of the
speaker. In this experiment, participants drew inferences
about the perceived knowledge of the speaker, his perceived
support and the kind of information that the prediction re-
lies on (e.g., information about past matches). In addition,
participants focused on the perceived processes of forming
predictions (e.g., intuition), assessed judgments about the
speaker’s attitude toward the betting situation (e.g., encour-
aging or not) and focused on potential consequences for the
speaker (e.g., responsibility, correctness).
We derived hypotheses based on existing empirical ev-
idence showing that participants preferred to use internal
probability phrases made by experts. This was related with
the perception that experts “took responsibility” in their pre-
diction by using a first person pronoun. In contrast, par-
ticipants preferred to use the external probability phrases
of novices, which they felt reflected a greater responsibility
than internal probability phrases (Fox & Malle, 1997). We
hypothesized that novice speakers uttering an external prob-
ability phrase would be judged as more knowledgeable, less
supportive of the team and less encouraging, but also less
wrong and blameworthy if the team lost, than speakers utter-
ing internal probability phrases. We expected the results to
be mirrored for expert speakers.
5.1 Method
Participants. Overall 81 Psychology students from Birm-
ingham University took part in the survey, mostly female
(80%). Participants’ ages ranged from 18 to 24 (M = 18.94,
SD = 1.03).
Design. We employed a 2 (Uncertainty source: internal
vs. external) × 2 (Expertise: novice vs. expert) × 2 (Prob-
ability magnitude: very uncertain vs. almost certain) mixed
design. The first two factors were manipulated between-
subjects, whereas probability magnitude was manipulated
within-subject. Thus, each participant read two out of eight
possible predictions.
Materials and procedure. The source of uncertainty was
manipulated as in Experiment 3 (i.e., I am or It is preceded
the prediction). Expertise wasmanipulated by presenting the
speaker (i.e., Miro) as having either a very limited experience
of the league (novice speaker; i.e., “He has watched some of
the champion league matches 5 years ago and has never read
any magazines on football”), or an extensive experience (ex-
pert speaker; i.e., “He has watched all the champion league
matches of the last 5 years and he reads different magazines
on football”). Each participant assessed two predictions, one
conveying a low probability (It is [I am] very uncertain that
FC Nitra will win against FC Senec) and one conveying a
high probability (It is [I am] almost certain that ZTSDubnica
will win against Spartak Trnava). The order of presentation
of the two predictions was randomized.
After reading Miro’s prediction, participants judged to
what extent: (1) Miro has knowledge about these teams; (2)
Miro is supporting FC Nitra; (3) Miro would be wrong in
the case where FC Nitra does not win against FC Senec; (4)
Miro could be blamed if one bets and loses; (5) the prediction
could be seen as an encouragement to bet on FC Nitra; (6)
the prediction relies on the results of previous matches; (7)
the prediction relies on intuition. Then, participants assessed
whether they would bet on the team in question. The order
of presentation of the questions was randomized for each
participant. All the judgments were provided on a 5-point
Likert scale ranging from 1: Not at all, to 5: Very much.
Finally, participants assessed the probability conveyed by
Miro for the two predictions. Participants were given the
two predictions that they had judged, finished by “because”.
The answer to this question was not analysed as part of the
present paper. Finally, participants provided their socio-
demographic details.
5.2 Results
Manipulation check. We tested whether the manipula-
tion of the probability was effective and whether the source
of uncertainty and the speaker’s expertise affected the per-
ceived probability of participants, as this could suggest that
the effects of the independent variables were due to an indi-
rect effect through probability perception. We conducted a
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 12, No. 5, September 2017 I am vs. it is uncertain, determinants and consequences 458
Knowl. Wrong. Supprt. Blame Encour. Freq. Intuition
Will
to bet
Internal uncertainty
External uncertainty
Judgment domain
R
a
ti
n
g
 (
L
ik
e
rt
 s
c
a
le
)
0
1
2
3
4
5
Panel A: Low Probability − Novice
Knowl. Wrong. Supprt. Blame Encour. Freq. Intuition
Will
to bet
Internal uncertainty
External uncertainty
Judgment domain
R
a
ti
n
g
 (
L
ik
e
rt
 s
c
a
le
)
0
1
2
3
4
5
Panel B: Low Probability − Expert
Knowl. Wrong. Supprt. Blame Encour. Freq. Intuition
Will
to bet
Internal uncertainty
External uncertainty
Judgment domain
R
a
ti
n
g
 (
L
ik
e
rt
 s
c
a
le
)
0
1
2
3
4
5
Panel C: High Probability − Novice
Knowl. Wrong. Supprt. Blame Encour. Freq. Intuition
Will
to bet
Internal uncertainty
External uncertainty
Judgment domain
R
a
ti
n
g
 (
L
ik
e
rt
 s
c
a
le
)
0
1
2
3
4
5
Panel D: High Probability − Expert
Figure 2: Effect of expertise and source of uncertainty on judgments about recipients’ inferences for low and high probability
phrases (N = 81), Experiment 4. Judgments were given on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1: Not at all to 5: Completely.
Error bars are 95% confidence intervals.
mixed design variance analysis with probability magnitude,
source, and expertise as independent variables and probabil-
ity perception as dependent variable. The probability mag-
nitude manipulation was successful: participants perceived
the probability phrase featuring almost certain as conveying
a high probability (M = 7.67, SD = 1.43; and very uncer-
tain as conveying a low probability (M = 3.22, SD = 2.48),
F(1,77) = 266.47, p < .001, η2
p
= .78). Furthermore, and
importantly, the source of uncertainty and the expertise of
the speaker did not have a main effect or an interaction effect
on probability perception, Fs < 1. Therefore, internal and
external probability phrases were perceived as conveying the
same level of probability.
Effects of the uncertainty source, expertise and proba-
bility magnitude. Figure 2 shows the mean responses as
a function of the source of uncertainty, probability conveyed
and expertise of the speaker. We analyzed the effects on
each response using t-tests as in Experiment 3. The proba-
bility manipulation affected all measures at p < .001 except
for Frequency, Intuition, and Knowledge, where effects were
not significant even at p < .05. Aside from this effect, the
Wrong measure was not affected by any manipulation, so
is not discussed further. Likewise, the source manipulation
(“I” vs. “It”) and the expertise manipulation did not have an
overall main effect on any measure (although Willingness to
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bet and Know were almost significantly higher with higher
expertise, p = .07 for both).
The main result of interest is that the interaction be-
tween expertise and source was significant for Encourage-
ment, Support, and Know (with respective p-values of .011,
.026, and .011) and almost significant for Willingness to bet
(p=.0723). In all cases, ratings were higher when experts
used “I” and when non-experts used “It”. The interaction
effects reflect that participants judged an expert uttering an
internal probability phrase as more knowledgeable and more
encouraging than an expert uttering an external probability
phrase, whereas they considered the opposite was true of
a novice: a non-expert using an internal probability phrase
rather than an external one is seen as more knowledgeable
and more encouraging. Similarly, experts were perceived
to be more supportive of the team when producing an in-
ternal probability phrase than when producing an external
probability phrase, whereas non-experts were judged more
supportive when uttering an external probability phrase. Fi-
nally, participants were keener to bet on the team when ex-
perts used an internal probability phrase than an external
one, but were keener to bet on an external prediction made
by a novice.4
Table 4 offers a bird’s eye view of the results of Exper-
iments 3 and 4.5 The inferences drawn from the subject
pronoun are consistent with the hypothesis that it reflects
the source. The effect of the subject varied as a function
of the probability conveyed and of the level of expertise of
the speaker. The results show that recipients use the phrase
subject and the expertise of the speaker together to draw in-
ferences about the knowledge and attitude of the speaker, as
well as to assess the persuasiveness of the message. There-
fore, tomaximize communication impact, experts should use
internal markers of uncertainty (I am certain that...), whereas
novices should use external linguisticmarkers of uncertainty.
6 General discussion
Thirty-four years ago, Kahneman and Tversky (1982) de-
scribed four variants of uncertainty and posited that those
variants were connected with specific lexical preferences in
uncertainty communication. They provided tentative defi-
nitions of the variants of uncertainty and some compelling
examples of linguistic markers of the source (e.g., the prob-
ability is vs. my probability is. . . ). It is only recently that
the role of the source of uncertainty and its representation in
language has been more systematically tested (Fox & Ülkü-
men, 2017; Løhre & Teigen, 2016; Ülkümen et al., 2016).
4This interaction for Support was significantly greater when probability
was high (p = .016 for this “triple interaction”) but was not significant for
any other measure.
5As shown in the table but not mentioned before, Encouragement and
Willingness to bet in Experiment 4 were affected by the probability manip-
ulation (p-values of .001 and .042, respectively).
Table 4: Summary of the effect of the main factors: source
of uncertainty, probability magnitude and expertise on judg-
ments in Experiments 3 (2 Source * 3 Probability, mixed-
design) and 4 (2 Source * 2 Expertise * 2 Probability, mixed-
design).
Source Source *
Probability
Source *
Expertise
Experiment 3
Knowledge No Yes --
Support No No --
Based on statistics Yes No --
Informativeness Yes No --
Use if betting No Yes --
Experiment 4
Knowledge No No Yes
Support No No Yes
Wrongness No No No
Blame No No No
Encouragement No Yes Yes
Frequency No No No
Intuition No No No
Willingness to bet No Yes Almost
However, there is currently a debate over what is actually
marking the source of uncertainty in uncertainty language.
Researchers have used the examples provided by Kahneman
and Tversky (1982) differently: some have focused on the
subject of the phrase and some on the probability term being
used. Unsurprisingly, the theoretical account of researchers
focusing on the probability terms posited that only the prob-
ability term was a marker of the source, and that the subject
was a marker of subjectivity (Fox & Ülkümen, 2017). In
contrast, the account of researchers focusing on the sentence
subject posited that the subject was a better marker of the
source (Teigen & Løhre 2017). The work presented here
assumed that the pronoun subject of probability phrases was
used as a marker of the source of uncertainty as hypothesised
byKahneman andTversky (1982) and substantiated byLøhre
& Teigen (2016). Furthermore, this account also posits a
positive relationship between internal-external source of un-
certainty and the level of objectivity of a speaker. We aimed
to test the determinants and consequences of the use of pro-
noun subjects as markers of the source of uncertainty.
Our results indicate that speakers use pronouns to mark
the source of the uncertainty. They also indirectly indicate
that speakers use pronouns primarily to mark the subjec-
tivity of the source of their uncertainty, but for recipients,
the pronoun may be used to infer both the source of un-
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certainty and the subjectivity of the speaker. For example,
speakers selected more often the “I” prediction for more
knowable outcomes (more objective), whereas unknowable
outcomes (subjective in nature) were more often described
with the neuter pronoun “It” (Experiment 2). In contrast,
in the recipients’ studies, both the source of uncertainty and
the subjectivity of the speaker could explain our pattern of
results. For example, we could describe the results of Ex-
periment 4 as follows: “experts providing prediction based
on internal knowledge are more convincing than experts pro-
viding predictions based on external information”, but also
as follows: “experts providing a subjective prediction are
more convincing than experts providing an objective predic-
tion”. Future research designed to test the different accounts
of uncertainty markers would provide more solid evidence.
Results also point to new determinants and consequences
of the sentence subject. In terms of determinants of sen-
tence subjects, we found that circumstantial factors, such as
the probability of occurrence of the outcome or the subject
used by a conversational partner predicted the preference
for a specific pronoun subject (Experiment 1). Interestingly,
those factorswere not related to the source of uncertainty, nor
to its subjectivity. Regarding novel effects of the sentence
subject, we found that the sentence subject affected people’s
willingness to use the prediction if betting (Experiments 3
and 4). This indicates that the sentence subject may also be
a pragmatic signal of the course of action recommended by
the speaker. In line with this argument, participants also felt
that the sentence subject was related to the level of encour-
agement to bet of the speaker (Experiment 4). Altogether,
these findings indicate that the sentence subject has several
semantic and pragmatic functions: it is not only used by re-
cipients to infer the source of uncertainty, or the subjectivity
of the speaker.
6.1 Theoretical update for linguistic markers
of the source of uncertainty
Our approach to uncertainty language is that it is like a tool
box from which speakers draw different tools that they use
in a creative and goal oriented way. Building on previous
accounts of the language of uncertainty (Fox & Ülkümen,
2017; Teigen & Løhre 2017) and the present results, we pro-
pose that the subject and the probability term mark the same
qualitative information – the source of uncertainty – and that
they combine to create different quantitative levels of inter-
nality or externality. In line with this account, data suggest
that the nature of the subject and the type of probability term
have been shown to correlate in a corpus of natural language
(Ülkümen et al., 2016). The rules for combining the added
value of different markers of the source could be simple,
such as a basic addition (internal pronoun + internal term
= very internal) or could be more driven by the subject, as
suggested by (Løhre & Teigen, 2016; Teigen & Løhre 2017).
We also propose that linguistic markers of the source have
consequences for the subjectivity perception of recipients.
Our position is that recipients infer the level of subjectivity
of speakers based on their source of uncertainty, together
with the characteristics of the context (e.g., who is speak-
ing, in which context, about which outcome). This model
emphasizes the importance of the context, similarly to the
model proposed by Fox and Irwin (1998). In our model, the
source of uncertainty and the subjectivity are not psycho-
logically independent given that the source of uncertainty
is a determinant of subjectivity. The interaction effects
found in Experiment 1 (with probability conveyed) and in
Experiment 4 (with probability conveyed and the expertise
of the speaker) support the view that the sentence subject of
probability phrases does not translate directly into a level of
subjectivity.
Finally, our account posits that the source is a sufficient
condition to trigger the use of different sentence subjects, but
also acknowledges that it is not the only factor shaping this
preference. Our model embraces that the sentence subject
could be used to indicate other things than the source of
uncertainty, including simply and directly the subjectivity of
the speaker.
6.2 Insight into how speakers choose internal
and external probability phrases
Overall, our data suggest that the nature of the outcome and
the context in which it is predicted drive the preference for
internal and external probability phrases.
Preference for internal probability phrases to conveyhigh
likelihood. Participants preferred to describe outcomes
that were more likely with internal probability phrases. This
was for example the case when they described the output of
the cast of a die (Experiment 1). Participants preferred to say
“I am quite certain” than “It is quite certain” but would rather
say “It is not certain” than “I am not certain”. The prefer-
ence for internal probability phrases is consistent with Fox
and Malle’s (1997) findings, who showed similarly that high
numerical probabilities were more often introduced with the
internal probability term confidence (“I am X% confident”)
and low numerical probabilities with the external probability
term probability. The preference to convey high probabili-
ties with the first person pronoun also fits well with the idea
that more knowledgeable speakers prefer to use an internal
source of uncertainty (Fox & Malle, 1997), and the fact that
a lower degree of internal certainty is enough for participants
to use a prediction (Løhre & Teigen, 2016).
The preference for internal high probability phrases and
external low probability phrases observed in our experiment
is limited to low negative probability phrases and high pos-
itive probability phrases. In our design, the lower probabil-
ity phrases were also negative (i.e., uncertain, not certain)
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whereas the high probability phrase was positive (i.e., quite
certain). Hence, the preference for the external source could
have been driven by the negative directionality of the lower
probability phrases, and the preference for the internal source
by the positive directionality of the high probability phrases.
Negative probability phrases attract the recipients’ attention
towards the possibility that the target outcome will not occur
(Juanchich, Teigen & Villejoubert, 2010; Sher &McKenzie,
2006). Using a first person pronoun negative directionality
phrase may amount to acknowledging less and less certainty
which participants may have wanted to avoid. In contrast,
using an external negative low probability phrasemay simply
indicate that new evidence shows that the event is less likely
than before. Future research should disentangle the role of
the directionality of probability phrases in the preference
for internal and external probability phrases, for example by
offering a choice between a crossing of directionality and
markers of the source (external low negative, external low
positive vs. internal low negative, external low positive). A
corpus study of people’s preferences could also offer a more
ecologically valid picture of people’s preference.
Known and knowable outcomes aremore often described
with internal probability phrases. Our findings do not
support that the time location of an outcome (i.e., in the
past or the future) is on its own a predictor of the source
of uncertainty that people choose to convey. For example,
when assessing their uncertainty about the dangerousness of
drugs, participants did not use a higher proportion of inter-
nal probability phrases for drugs of the past than for drugs
of the future (Experiment 1). This hypothesis was derived
from the common assumption that past outcomes rely more
on lack of knowledge – hence an internal uncertainty – than
future outcomes, which rely on both lack of knowledge and
world stochastic processes – hence a mixture of internal and
external uncertainty (Brun & Teigen, 1990). However, the
relationship between temporality and the source of uncer-
tainty might not be as straightforward. We proposed that the
knowability of an outcome – the extent to which knowledge
can reduce uncertainty – is a better predictor of the source
of uncertainty experienced than the temporal location of the
outcome. Results of Experiment 2 were consistent with
this hypothesis: participants consistently preferred external
probability phrases for past or present outcomes that are un-
knowable (e.g., life onMars) and preferred internal probabil-
ity phrases for past known and future predictable outcomes
(e.g., the size of the Eiffel Tower and sea rise in 2100). We
could infer from these findings that when making simple
predictions, people have a preference for internal probability
phrases because there are more facts that are known (e.g.,
the size of the Eiffel Tower) and future outcomes that are
predictable and will be known, over outcomes that are un-
knowable.
Preference for markers of the source of uncertainty in
conversations. Many predictions are not done in a con-
versational vacuum. Hence, we also investigated the role
of previously voiced opinions on participants’ preferences
for internal and external probability phrases. Our findings
showed that participants mirrored the source conveyed by
their conversational partners, whether they agreed or dis-
agreed with them (Experiment 1). This finding opens a new
line of investigation, whereby the source of uncertainty of
one person can affect the source of uncertainty expressed
by another, simply by mirroring the choice of words and
perhaps also by influencing the recipient’s perceived source
of uncertainty. Further research could focus on the effect
of internal and external probability phrases on recipients’
perceived source of uncertainty. This mirroring in conversa-
tion appears in line with the idea of coordination in dialogue
and conversational alignment (Garrod & Anderson, 1987;
Garrod & Pickering, 2004), characterized, for example, by
lexical repetition (Garrod&Anderson, 1987; Garrod&Pick-
ering, 2004). In our experiment, participants aligned their
speech to their dialogue partner by making the same lexical
choice and reusing the same pronoun subject.
By identifying factors that determine the preference for
linguistic markers of the source of uncertainty in language,
we inform factors that determine the type of uncertainty
that people experience. Based on the findings presented
here, we can suggest that people experience more internal
uncertainty when experiencing higher levels of certainty,
and knowability of the outcome, whether they gain more
certainty by learning or over time. We have also shown that
more incidental contextual factors drive the preference for
markers of the source of uncertainty, such as the marker of
the source used by a dialogue partner. In this case, themarker
of the source may have a difference function: to increase the
social coordination between dialogue partners.
Building on the finding that, out of a dialogue, the pro-
noun subjects of probability phrases are used as markers of
the source of uncertainty of the speaker, which is itself de-
rived from specific contexts, one could expect that hearers
of those markers would make specific inferences about the
speaker and the context. We have tested this hypothesis in
two experiments.
6.3 Insight into what recipients infer from lin-
guistic markers of the source of uncer-
tainty
Inferences about the speaker. Speakers uttering external
probability phrases were hypothesized to be perceived as
more knowledgeable (Løhre & Teigen, 2016), but this was
not found consistently (Løhre & Teigen; Experiment 1 vs.
Experiment 3 and 4). The present paper’s findings (Exper-
iments 3 and 4) shed some light on the reasons why results
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were inconsistent. A probability phrase with a third person
neuter pronoun subject was not a sufficient condition for the
speaker to appear as more knowledgeable. However, the
pronoun subject did determine the perceived knowledge of
the speaker, in interaction with the probability conveyed in
the prediction and the expertise of the speaker. For example,
hearers inferred that novices uttering external probability
phrases were more knowledgeable than novices uttering in-
ternal probability phrases, whereas they inferred the opposite
from expert speakers, who were considered as more knowl-
edgeable when they gave internal phrases. Our results did
not support that the use of internal or external probability
phrases was a cue of the speakers’ wishes (Experiment 3 and
4). This appears in contrast with Løhre andTeigen’s findings,
showing that, in the context of football predictions, internal
probability phrases led recipients to believe that the speaker
supported the team more than external probability phrases
did (Experiment 4). The designs of the studies differ in a
key point: we kept the probability conveyed by the speaker
as constant (e.g., quite certain) and varied only the pronoun
subject of the sentence (e.g., I am quite certain vs. It is quite
certain). In contrast, Løhre and Teigen asked participants to
complete an internal or external probability phrase with the
numerical probability that would be most appropriate before
they assessed the attitude of the speaker. The probability as-
sociated with internal probability phrases was higher (e.g.,
I am 57% certain . . . ) than in the external condition (e.g.,
It is 45% certain), hence the probability phrases differed by
more than the pronouns they featured. Speakers uttering an
internal probability phrase may have been perceived as more
supportive of the target team because they also conveyed a
higher probability that the team would win.
Inferences about the prediction. In line with previous
findings, our data showed that recipients judged external
probability phrases as more informative than internal proba-
bility phrases. This replicates previous findings of the effect
of the markers when associated with numerical probability
phrases (Løhre & Teigen, 2016). In addition, consistent with
Løhre and Teigen, we found that recipients did not think that
internal probability phrases were more likely to be based on
intuition than external probability phrases.
Inferences, implications for decision-making. As noted
by Løhre and Teigen (2016), the internal-external probabil-
ity distinction does not have a place in normative decision-
making models but should definitely feature in descriptive
models of decision-making, given that the source of uncer-
tainty reflects a psychological reality that affects people’s
judgments and decisions. The source of uncertainty con-
veyed via the pronoun subject of the probability phrase did
not have a main effect on the decision, but it interacted with
the probability conveyed by the speaker and with his ex-
pertise to affect willingness to bet. Participants were more
willing to use a low external probability phrase than a low
internal probability phrase in betting but would rather use a
high internal probability phrase than a high external prob-
ability phrase (Experiments 3 and 4). Further, participants
were somewhat more willing to bet based on an internal
probability phrase voiced by an expert, but keener to bet
based on an external probability phrase voiced by a novice
(Experiment 4).
We offer here insights into the properties of probability
phrases, the determinants of their selection and their effects
on the judgments and decisions of recipients. This could in-
form risk communication in different key societal domains,
where risk communication is seen as a major challenge,
such as in finance (Doupnik & Richter, 2003, 2004; Laswad
& Mak, 1999), climate change (Budescu, Broomell & Por,
2009; Budescu, Por, Broomell & Smithson, 2014; Budescu,
Por & Broomell, 2012; Patt & Schrag, 2003; Patt & Suraje,
2005; Sterman, 2011), medicine (Berry & Hochhauser,
2006; Berry, Knapp & Raynor, 2002; Berry, Raynor &
Knapp, 2003), sentencing decisions (Dhami, 2008) or mili-
tary intelligence (Dhami, Mandel, Mellers & Tetlock, 2015;
Hastie, 1993). The difficulty of communicating uncertainty
has led some regulatory bodies (e.g., the IPCC for climate
change) to recommend the use of a reduced list of probabil-
ity phrases. However, these lists do not feature the pronoun
subject to be used and, hence, still leave room for variability.
The features of probability phrases can be seen as a challenge
but could also be seen as an asset that could be harnessed
to develop more effective risk communication guidelines.
For example, experts should use more internal probability
phrases to appear more convincing whereas novices may be
more effective by using external probability phrases.
6.4 Conclusion
In four experiments on uncertainty communication, we fo-
cused on the interpretation of whole probability phrases
rather than isolated probability words (e.g., I am certain
instead of certain) in which we manipulated the phrase sub-
ject (I am uncertain vs. it is uncertain). The present research
brings some innovative findings about the factors that drive
the preference for internal and external probability phrases.
Results showed that participants exhibited consistent prefer-
ence patterns, depending on their subjective probability, the
degree to which knowledge could reduce uncertainty and, in
dialogue, based on the source of uncertainty conveyed by a
dialogue partner. The present paper demonstrates that pro-
noun subjects are (among other usages) used as linguistic
markers of the source of uncertainty of the speaker, and that
they affect recipients’ judgments and decision-making.
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Appendix: Questionnaire used in
Study 2
Below you will find a set of pairwise statements that express
different degrees of certainty or uncertainty. Your task is to
compare the two sentences in each pair and place a cross next
to the sentence that appears more natural and sounds like an
actual occurring statement. Even if they both seem natural,
try to select the one that most likely is a genuine quotation.
1 [known_HighP]
(a) It is almost certain that UN was founded after the war
(b) I am almost certain that UN was founded after the war
2 [Predictable_HighP]
(a) It is quite certain that Spain will get to the 2012 Euro-
pean Football Championship
(b) I am quite certain that Spain will get to the 2012
European Football Championship
3 [Known_LowP]
(a) It is uncertain whether Sweden won the last match
against Denmark
(b) I am uncertain about whether Sweden won the last
match against Denmark
4 [Predictable_LowP]
(a) It is uncertain whether Sweden will win the next match
against Denmark
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(b) I am uncertainwhether Swedenwill win the nextmatch
against Denmark
5 [Unknowable_HighP]
(a) It is quite certain that there is life on other planets
(b) I am quite certain that there is life on other planets
6 [Unknowable_LowP]
(a) It is uncertain whether Robin Hood has actually lived
(b) I am uncertain about whether Robin Hood has actually
lived
7 [Known_Low]
(a) It is uncertain whether Lithuania is south of Latvia
(b) I am uncertain about whether Lithuania is south of
Latvia
8 [Known_High]
(a) It is certain that Toulouse is in France
(b) I am certain that Toulouse is in France
9 [Predictable_Low]
(a) It is not certain what I will do tomorrow
(b) I am not certain what I will do tomorrow
10[Predictable_Low]
(a) It is not certain that Hans will accept the offer
(b) I am not certain that Hans will accept the offer
Part II
Which of these two sentences are more convincing?
(a) It is certain I will arrive in time
(b) I am certain I will arrive in time
Which of these speakers will finish first?
A says: “It is not certain I will be finished on Monday”
B says: “I am not certain I will be finished on Monday”
